[sciborg2]

So, to say that "mind" is only neuronal activity sort of seems, to me, to be akin to saying the house and the pile of rubble are the same thing.  Except, of course, they aren't, because the structure and relation are keys to what makes a "whole" of it's constituent parts.

So the structure inherently contains the meaning - a sort of Platonism - when there's recursion?

I would agree there seems to a dismissal of structure's importance among the more spiritual crowd that tries to compare the brain to a radio controlled car* but it also seems to me structures don't have determinate meaning - at least from the outside. So the idea here would be a structure - or at least a structure + process - brings about mental characteristics to the inside...right?

*Though Einstein did write the introduction to Upton Sinclair's book on telepathy Mental Radio...

[H]

So the structure inherently contains the meaning - a sort of Platonism - when there's recursion?

I would agree there seems to a dismissal of structure's importance among the more spiritual crowd that tries to compare the brain to a radio controlled car* but it also seems to me structures don't have determinate meaning - at least from the outside. So the idea here would be a structure - or at least a structure + process - brings about mental characteristics to the inside...right?

*Though Einstein did write the introduction to Upton Sinclair's book on telepathy Mental Radio...

Hmm, I'm not sure, obviously I have no thought this out thoroughly.  But I don't think structure has to equal meaning.  I could imagine structures that are meaningless though, right?  It's just that what we call "meaning" is generally found through relations, structle being one that comes up often?

But I think I agree, structure, relation and process, that is what mind is.  Where is the recursion?  Well, because we are structured in relation to ourselves in such a way that the process of Being, that is, Dasein (human Being) takes itself into account in what it is Be (or what is is in Becoming).  So self-consciousness is recursively considering itself, that is, it's relation to itself (in addition to other things), in it's Being.

Does that make sense?  I don't even know, but off the top of my head it seems to, maybe.  Or maybe it's a word-salad.

[sciborg2]

So the structure inherently contains the meaning - a sort of Platonism - when there's recursion?

I would agree there seems to a dismissal of structure's importance among the more spiritual crowd that tries to compare the brain to a radio controlled car* but it also seems to me structures don't have determinate meaning - at least from the outside. So the idea here would be a structure - or at least a structure + process - brings about mental characteristics to the inside...right?

*Though Einstein did write the introduction to Upton Sinclair's book on telepathy Mental Radio...

Hmm, I'm not sure, obviously I have no thought this out thoroughly.  But I don't think structure has to equal meaning.  I could imagine structures that are meaningless though, right?  It's just that what we call "meaning" is generally found through relations, structle being one that comes up often?

But I think I agree, structure, relation and process, that is what mind is.  Where is the recursion?  Well, because we are structured in relation to ourselves in such a way that the process of Being, that is, Dasein (human Being) takes itself into account in what it is Be (or what is is in Becoming).  So self-consciousness is recursively considering itself, that is, it's relation to itself (in addition to other things), in it's Being.

Does that make sense?  I don't even know, but off the top of my head it seems to, maybe.  Or maybe it's a word-salad.

So before self-consciousness is Consciousness? Marcus Arvan has an argument like that, he told me he was going to publish a paper on how to reconcile his Computationalism with his (functional at least) Dualism...It's interesting as he doesn't necessarily claim there are insenstate structures, that even video game characters might suffer...I explained to him how a game character doesn't even have independent "parts" necessarily, sharing aspects in Unity for example...but he was (AFAICTell) undeterred....

[H]

So before self-consciousness is Consciousness? Marcus Arvan has an argument like that, he told me he was going to publish a paper on how to reconcile his Computationalism with his (functional at least) Dualism...It's interesting as he doesn't necessarily claim there are insenstate structures, that even video game characters might suffer...I explained to him how a game character doesn't even have independent "parts" necessarily, sharing aspects in Unity for example...but he was (AFAICTell) undeterred....

In an underthought out way, maybe?  I think (maybe?, some?) animals are conscious, but exactly what that "non-self" consciousness is, exactly, well, that is hard to say.  But I think I am lapsing to a real Phenomenological stance though.  Or, so it seems to me I might be.

But I think when most people talk about consciousness, they really specifically mean human consciousness, which is self-consciousness specifically, I think.  Because Dasein (Human Being, self-conscious Being) is different (presumably) than, say, Ape Being, or Octopus Being, as far as I can tell at least.

[sciborg2]

So before self-consciousness is Consciousness? Marcus Arvan has an argument like that, he told me he was going to publish a paper on how to reconcile his Computationalism with his (functional at least) Dualism...It's interesting as he doesn't necessarily claim there are insenstate structures, that even video game characters might suffer...I explained to him how a game character doesn't even have independent "parts" necessarily, sharing aspects in Unity for example...but he was (AFAICTell) undeterred....

In an underthought out way, maybe?  I think (maybe?, some?) animals are conscious, but exactly what that "non-self" consciousness is, exactly, well, that is hard to say.  But I think I am lapsing to a real Phenomenological stance though.  Or, so it seems to me I might be.

But I think when most people talk about consciousness, they really specifically mean human consciousness, which is self-consciousness specifically, I think.  Because Dasein (Human Being, self-conscious Being) is different (presumably) than, say, Ape Being, or Octopus Being, as far as I can tell at least.

When you say lapsing into a real Phenom. Stance, do you mean a position where there is something mental or at least proto-mental (whatever that means) in Nature?

I guess I'm curious because you seem to be trying to reconcile Hegel's Idealism with a more Physicalist position, or am I reading you wrong there?

[H]

When you say lapsing into a real Phenom. Stance, do you mean a position where there is something mental or at least proto-mental (whatever that means) in Nature?

I guess I'm curious because you seem to be trying to reconcile Hegel's Idealism with a more Physicalist position, or am I reading you wrong there?

I don't know about that.  I think it would depend on what "in nature" means.  Because, of course, to me, humans are in (and of nature).  But I think I mean, more so, that I am taking for granted, or making the assumption that what self-consciousness seems to be, experientially or phenomenologically, it somewhat actually is (or that it is at all).  And also, what just consciousness (i.e. non-self consciousness) is, also actually is what it seems (to us) to be (and not be).

But I think you are right, I find myself being something of both a bad Hegelian and a bad Psysicalist.  I'm also (something of) a Monist, probably.  I think "mentality" isn't an innate state of matter, in the same way that "wetness" isn't.  It's a product of structure and relation.  Matter can deliver what we call "mind" in the same sort of way that matter can deliver a house or a pile of rubble, just depending on how it's structured in relation to us.

[sciborg2]

But I think you are right, I find myself being something of both a bad Hegelian and a bad Psysicalist.  I'm also (something of) a Monist, probably.  I think "mentality" isn't an innate state of matter, in the same way that "wetness" isn't.  It's a product of structure and relation.  Matter can deliver what we call "mind" in the same sort of way that matter can deliver a house or a pile of rubble, just depending on how it's structured in relation to us.

Wetness as in the feeling of something being wet, or liquid as a matter-state?

So some structures are special, giving feels/thoughts/etc, and other structures are not? Or do all structures have something-it-is-to-be-like them?