So cause-effect are relations, but there is something that makes the cause(s) precede a particular effect(s). Whatever it is that ensures the relation holds is the thing-in-itself.
There simply cannot just be relations, there have to be relata.
Right, I mean, I am not the sort of skeptic to claim there are no Noumena. I think that is frankly absurd. So, there is/are relata, but what else could we say about them but their relations? Even for first-person conscious experience, what could we say of that except how it relates to itself?
So, I am failing to grasp the argument in that quote. The first two sentences, I agree with fully. We only have access to the phenomenal, not the noumenal. Then a seeming speculative leap is made, to propose two classes of "aspect." Which is well and fine, but I don't follow that this distinction makes much sense. For example, if we take an electron as a having a "negative charge" of course we could say that it has no negative charge in-itself, since if not in relation to something with no charge, or a positive charge, what is its charge? There isn't an answer to that, as far as I could tell. Charge only relates something in so far as it relates
to anything, no?
So, to then posit that consciousness could not be relational seems unfounded. Why can't consciousness be expressed in "a language of interactions and relations?" Could a particle's charge be discussed absent the interaction and relation of other things? What is "charge" in-itself? I don't see it as Substance, that is, something which can be explained with no reference to anything else. Surely the sort of consciousness that is being referred to is self-consciousness and so, at the very least, we'd have to admit that this relates and interacts with itself, no? So to say that consciousness, as experienced, must be some "special class" of somehow immediate non-interactional, non-relational noumenal relata, I don't know, seems unfounded to me. It seems to me that the quote posits that consciousness in-itself (which for-itself, as far as I can tell) must be the in-itself in itself. But all we have is the
for-itself of consciousness to inform us of that!
In other words, why are we taking the phenomena of consciousness as
necessarily the noumena of consciousness?
Maybe I am just thinking about this in the fundamentally wrong way or something...