[H]

However, I have been asked so often whether I believe in the existence of God or not that I am somewhat concerned lest I be taken for an adherent of “psychologism” far more commonly than I suspect. What most people overlook or seem unable to understand is the fact that I regard the psyche as real. They believe only in physical facts, and must consequently come to the conclusion that either the uranium itself or the laboratory equipment created the atom bomb. That is no less absurd than the assumption that a non-real psyche is responsible for it. God is an obvious psychic and non-physical fact, i.e., a fact that can be established psychically but not physically. Equally, these people have still not got it into their heads that the psychology of religion falls into two categories, which must be sharply distinguished from one another: firstly, the psychology of the religious person, and secondly, the psychology of religion proper, i.e., of religious contents.

C. G. Jung - "An Answer to Job"

[TaoHorror]

However, I have been asked so often whether I believe in the existence of God or not that I am somewhat concerned lest I be taken for an adherent of “psychologism” far more commonly than I suspect. What most people overlook or seem unable to understand is the fact that I regard the psyche as real. They believe only in physical facts, and must consequently come to the conclusion that either the uranium itself or the laboratory equipment created the atom bomb. That is no less absurd than the assumption that a non-real psyche is responsible for it. God is an obvious psychic and non-physical fact, i.e., a fact that can be established psychically but not physically. Equally, these people have still not got it into their heads that the psychology of religion falls into two categories, which must be sharply distinguished from one another: firstly, the psychology of the religious person, and secondly, the psychology of religion proper, i.e., of religious contents.

C. G. Jung - "An Answer to Job"

Are you religious, H?

[H]

Are you religious, H?

No, although that probably makes my actual position definitively less clear.  I steal that quote from Jung, because he is infinitely more smart than I am and so can explain some aspects of my perspective far more eloquently than I ever could.

Anther quote from Peterson (I know you guys love him):

Then there is the conversation where one participant is trying to attain victory for his point of view. This is yet another variant of the dominance-hierarchy conversation. During such a conversation, which often tends toward the ideological, the speaker endeavours to (1) denigrate or ridicule the viewpoint of anyone holding a contrary position, (2) use selective evidence while doing so and, finally, (3) impress the listeners (many of whom are already occupying the same ideological space) with the validity of his assertions. The goal is to gain support for a comprehensive, unitary, oversimplified world-view. Thus, the purpose of the conversation is to make the case that not thinking is the correct tack. The person who is speaking in this manner believes that winning the argument makes him right, and that doing so necessarily validates the assumption-structure of the dominance hierarchy he most identifies with. This is often—and unsurprisingly—the hierarchy within which he has achieved the most success, or the one with which he is most temperamentally aligned. Almost all discussions involving politics or economics unfold in this manner, with each participant attempting to justify fixed, a priori positions instead of trying to learn something or to adopt a different frame (even for the novelty). It is for this reason that conservatives and liberals alike believe their positions to be self-evident, particularly as they become more extreme. Given certain temperamentally-based assumptions, a predictable conclusion emerges—but only when you ignore the fact that the assumptions themselves are mutable.

[TaoHorror]

Jesus, protect us from your followers

As a fellow Christian, I too can very much appreciate this one - originally saw it on a bumper sticker on a car in front of me, but research has it quoted by many, so not sure the original author. Says a lot on many levels, like great efficient code.

[H]

The affective systems that govern response to punishment, satisfaction, threat and promise all have a stake in attaining the ideal outcome. Anything that interferes with such attainment (little old ladies with canes) will be experienced as threatening and/or punishing; anything that signifies increased likelihood of success (open stretches of sidewalk) will be experienced as promising or satisfying. It is for this reason that the Buddhists believe that everything is Maya, or illusion: the motivational significance of ongoing events is clearly determined by the nature of the goal toward which behavior is devoted. That goal is conceptualized in episodic imagery—in fantasy. We constantly compare the world at present to the world idealized in fantasy, render affective judgment, and act in consequence.

Jordan Peterson Maps of Meaning

[H]

The phenomena that we would now describe as emotions or motive forces, from the per-spective of our modern, comparatively differentiated and acute self-consciousness, do not appear to have been experienced precisely as “internal” in their original form. Rather, they made their appearance as part and parcel of the experience (the event, or sequence of events) that gave rise to them, and adopted initial representational form in imaginative embodiment. The modern idea of the “stimulus” might be regarded as a vestigial remnant of this form of thinking—a form that grants the power of affective and behavioral control to the object (or which cannot distinguish between that which elicits a response, and the response itself). We no longer think “animistically” as adults, except in our weaker or more playful moments, because we attribute motivation and emotion to our own agency, and not (generally) to the stimulus that gives proximal rise to them. We can separate the thing from the implication of the thing, because we are students and beneficiaries of empirical thinking and experimental method. We can remove attribution of motive and affective power from the “object,” and leave it standing in its purely sensory and consensual aspect; can distinguish between what is us and what is world. The preexperimental mind could not (cannot) do this, at least not consistently; could not reliably discriminate between the object and its effect on behavior. It is that object and effect which, in totality, constitute a god (more accurately, it is a class of objects and their effects that constitute a god).

A god, so considered—more specifically, a potent and powerful god, one with a history—constitutes the manner in which a group or family of stimuli of isomorphic motivational significance reveals itself to or grips the collective (communicated) imagination of a given culture. Such a representation is a peculiar mix (from the later, empirical viewpoint) of psychological and sociological phenomena and objective “fact”—an undifferentiated mix of subject and object (of emotion and sensory experience), transpersonal in nature (as it is historically elaborated “construction” and shared imaginative experience). The primitive deity nonetheless serves as accurate representation of the ground of being, however, because it is affect and subjectivity as well as pure object (before the two are properly distilled or separated)—because it is primordial experience, rather than the mere primordial thing.

Jordan Peterson - Maps of Meaning

So, the 100?  And so then further, Yatwer as a Principle?

[SmilerLoki]

So, the 100?  And so then further, Yatwer as a Principle?

Does seem like it indeed. And in a way that would Earwa a simulacrum of consciousness without sacrificing realism and complexity.

But the problem is, real-world implications are much more moot. It it very hard to determine the effects of methodology and necessary learning on the mind. Right now we have things that are explained using specific frames of reference (be it Newtonian formalism in physics, computational logic paradigm used in computer science, etc.), and you need to understand those things to navigate any modern society. This necessity forces aforementioned frames of references on the mind, certainly, but saying it conditions the mind is going a bit too far, in my opinion. It doesn't displace other ways of understanding the world, or no new frames of reference or paradigms would've surfaced.

It's very hard to say whether our acquired method of interacting with the world really changed us, and if it did, then to what extent.

[H]

This necessity forces aforementioned frames of references on the mind, certainly, but saying it conditions the mind is going a bit too far, in my opinion. It doesn't displace other ways of understanding the world, or no new frames of reference or paradigms would've surfaced.

But that "forcing of a frame" isn't a form of "conditioning?"  At least in the sense of our "default" method of perceiving?

To use one of Bakker's favorite says, in a way, and put simply, if we view everything from a hammer's perspective, we will be apt to see far more nails than screws perhaps?

[SmilerLoki]

But that "forcing of a frame" isn't a form of "conditioning?"  At least in the sense of our "default" method of perceiving?

To use one of Bakker's favorite says, in a way, and put simply, if we view everything from a hammer's perspective, we will be apt to see far more nails than screws perhaps?

It's more of an obvious cognitive mistake than conditioning, the way I see it. Just using a wrong model out of habit. Like when I first start speaking English after speaking Russian for a while, I would have a horrible accent, which will mostly fade away given a few minutes. What happens there is me trying to pronounce English words using muscular routines developed for Russian ones, because I had just been speaking Russian before. And then I hear myself speak, realize that I'm doing it wrong, and correct my behavior.

It's even more complex than that, actually. I specifically developed other routines for speaking because my Russian ones weren't producing results in regards to speaking English. The point being, when you use an inappropriate frame of reference for something, it instantly negatively impacts your performance.

[H]

It's more of an obvious cognitive mistake than conditioning, the way I see it. Just using a wrong model out of habit. Like when I first start speaking English after speaking Russian for a while, I would have a horrible accent, which will mostly fade away given a few minutes. What happens there is me trying to pronounce English words using muscular routines developed for Russian ones, because I had just been speaking Russian before. And then I hear myself speak, realize that I'm doing it wrong, and correct my behavior.

It's even more complex than that, actually. I specifically developed other routines for speaking because my Russian ones weren't producing results in regards to speaking English. The point being, when you use an inappropriate frame of reference for something, it instantly negatively impacts your performance.

Fair point.  I think if we substitute the word "habituation" for "conditioning" we can perhaps see how they go hand-in-hand though.  Conditions provide us the frame, which we internally habituate into the default.  In this way, the habit then continues to condition the response to rely on the habitual frame, given it's previous utility.  So, the habit conditions and the conditioning habituates the frame, ad infinitum. 

That is, until something comes along and violates, forcing a new frame to be needed.  In this case though, the response could be to discover a new frame, or "double-down" and construe the violation in a manner that makes the frame fit, no matter how poorly.  So, in your example, the way you "correct" your "recognition" of "I'm doing it wrong" when using your Russian frame to speak English, is to shift the frame.  But there is a chance you could have gone the other way, deciding the English would be "better off" spoken with your Russian inflection and fostering on.

So, to come back around to Peterson's point, is to say then that our habit of characterizing the world only as objects, leads itself to continuance, even when it is simply not the right frame...

[SmilerLoki]

So, to come back around to Peterson's point, is to say then that our habit of characterizing the world only as objects, leads itself to continuance, even when it is simply not the right frame...

Indeed, it is the case. It is also a known cognitive bias:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automation_bias

The whole problem is, it reduces fitness, which stops its infinite propagation. Yes, it's encountered often, but it is not be all, end all of modern behavior. A mistake shouldn't be considered a model, its effect is different because its impact is negative.

For example, this is why Bakker can see what he sees in our society and shout his warnings. He wouldn't be able to do that if the things he warns about lay completely beyond every frame of reference available to humanity.

[H]

So, to come back around to Peterson's point, is to say then that our habit of characterizing the world only as objects, leads itself to continuance, even when it is simply not the right frame...

Indeed, it is the case. It is also a known cognitive bias:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automation_bias

The whole problem is, it reduces fitness, which stops its infinite propagation. Yes, it's encountered often, but it is not be all, end all of modern behavior. A mistake shouldn't be considered a model, its effect is different because its impact is negative.

For example, this is why Bakker can see what he sees in our society and shout his warnings. He wouldn't be able to do that if the things he warns about lay completely beyond every frame of reference available to humanity.

Right, right, I mean, there are ways out of the loop, the first being, of course, to recognize that the frame can be incorrect.  Next is conceptualize what the better frame would be.  But there is a reason why Bakker and Peterson aren't exactly highly regarded by most people though...

[SmilerLoki]

Right, right, I mean, there are ways out of the loop, the first being, of course, to recognize that the frame can be incorrect.  Next is conceptualize what the better frame would be.  But there is a reason why Bakker and Peterson aren't exactly highly regarded by most people though...

People actually hate to think, and being forced to think is loathed even harder. Thinking is all manners of inconvenient.

At the same time, I don't consider the opinion of the masses to be as important as it is presented today. Some things must be done, any opinion notwithstanding. It will come to "deal with it or die".

[H]

People actually hate to think, and being forced to think is loathed even harder. Thinking is all manners of inconvenient.

At the same time, I don't consider the opinion of the masses to be as important as it is presented today. Some things must be done, any opinion notwithstanding. It will come to "deal with it or die".

Right, it's not that the opinion (especially the uninformed opinion) of the masses is a qualifier, but it is a mark of what is generally going to happen.  So, difficult to accept facts are going to take a long time, if ever, to become permeate the general populace.  The cost will probably end up high, but the way that system might actually be for the better, even though it certainly is frustrating.

[SmilerLoki]

but it is a mark of what is generally going to happen.

It's like you say, more a mark of how soon it will happen and how well it's going to be received.

And I agree, this is one of the main reasons why many long-overdue improvements are stalled. I remember having a similar conversation with Wilshire about progress. Unimpeded progress is not the norm.